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STEFAN T. POSSONYt
ALiOST 1000 years ago, the now forgotten Bishop Gui d'Anjou in-
itiated one of history's great attempts to secure peace. He proclaimed
a truce of God and issued instructions limiting the use of arms. At the
same time, he mobilized the spiritual power of the Christian religion
against the scourge of war. To the surprise of many, the Bishop suc-
ceeded in curbing violence in his diocese; so impressive was his success
that other French Bishops emulated his example. In the year 1000, a
council at Poitiers adopted the motto "C-terre a la guerre" and passed a
resolution which obligated the princes of the Church to oppose war by
forceful means, that is, by the intervention of troops under religious
leadership. At a synod in Limoges in 1031, it was resolved to ex-
communicate violators of the peace. It was also decided that, should
moral coercion prove insufficient, military force was to be used against
any breakers of God's truce. The participants of the synod of Bruges
in 1038 swore to take military measures against Violators of ecclesiastic
peace laws. Under the energetic leadership of Archbishop Aimon of
Bourges several punitive expeditions were carried out against rebellious
knights; the Archbishop may, in fact, be considered as the earliest
predecessor of the commander of a modem international armed force.
Priests in large numbers fought in his peace enforcement army to safe-
guard the inherent justice and the disinterested nature of the inter-
vention. Unfortunately, Aimon's peace force was soon annihilated by a
group of knights who were more expert in the art of war than the 700
clerks whom they killed.'
During the 11th and 12th centuries, many French and German
dioceses adopted laws and institutions to impose the truce of God. The
iudices pacis determined whether or not the truce had been violated,
while the communitas pacis, a medieval security council, enforced the
decisions of the judicature. The principle of active maintenance of
God's truce was proclaimed time and again. Pope Urban II, in prepara-
tion of the Crusade, decreed a general pacification of the Occident to be
imposed by associations of nobles; the Crusade was to unite Christen-
dom and create the essential prerequisites of perennial world peace.
(Council of Clermont, 1095). Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) decreed
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that "pacenz et concordiam . . . praedicari ac seminari oportel," the
word seminari being a euphemism for "to coerce." - In the Council of
Avignon (1209) a resolution was passed that peace was to be forced
upon knights and towns. A few years later, the Council of Toulouse
perfected the legal framework for the maintenance of the truce of
God; it was ordered that
(a) every person over fourteen years of age was to pledge himself
with a solemn oath not to violate the truce of God and not to assist any
violator of the peace;
(b) this oath was to be repeated every three years, and a person re-
fusing to renew the pledge was to be treated as a breaker of the law;
(c) alliances between nobles were forbidden;
(d) any violator of the peace was to be attacked forthvith by all the
others who had pledged themselves to maintain peace; his territory
was to be cut off from communications and traffic; his stronghold was
to be besieged and stormed; the aggressor and his men were to be
punished severely and their property confiscated;
(e) the violator of the peace was to be excommunicated (a sanction
which frequently entailed economic ruin and even physical destruc-
tion);
(f) the subjects of the aggressor were formally ordered to revolt
against their master and to obstruct his aggression. 3
In some regions of France, it also became customary for the knights
who had obligated themselves to protect the truce of God to accept
personal responsibility for any breaches of the peace. Out of his own
pocket, the knight paid, or was expected to pay, an indemnity to those
persons who had suffered from illegal warfare which he had been unable
to prevent. 4
The overall success of these various measures was by no means small.
On the whole, fighting was limited to the period between Monday
morning and Thursday evening; the truce of God reigned on Fridays,
Saturdays, and Sundays. Certain groups of persons and institutions
enjoyed a perpetual peace of God-clerics, monks, nuns, pilgrims,
women, children, and workers, as well as churches, monasteries,
cemeteries, and tools of work.
WNe do not know whether the frequency and intensity of war was re-
duced between 1000 and 1250. We know that powerful princes often
disregarded the limitations imposed upon them and that they observed
the law only when it was in their interest to do so. But we also knov
that the truce and peace of God were strictly observed in many regions.
2. "Peace and concord ... must be proclaimed and begotten." 1 SLmcaon:, LA
PAIX ET LA TRkVE DE Dmu (2d ed. 1869) 35 et seq.
3. 2 id. at 62-7.
4. Id. at 251.
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Peace was enforced by the spiritual power of the Church, accompanied
by strong economic and sometimes military sanctions. But later the
church's power declined, and it was no longer able to impose its law.
In France wars tended to become perpetual; in Germany the inter-
regnum created conditions wherein everybody was everybody else's
enemy. Secular power then assumed the task of pacification. In
France, Saint Louis IX issued his famous ordonnance which outlawed
"private warfare"; an edict enforced by the power of his sword. In
Germany, Rudolph of Habsburg ended the lawless chaos by declaring
the Landfrieden. The maintenance of internal peace had become the
duty as well as the raison d'gtre of the secular state.6
DANTE AND DUBOIS
At the beginning of the 14th century, the question arose whetherinternational war could not also be limited. While the ideal of peace
was, of course, known to previous centuries, it is nevertheless correct
to say that the roots of modem pacifism go back to that period. Scho-
lastic philosophy, under the leadership of Thomas of Aquinas, had
insisted on the difference between just and unjust war. But now the
idea was pronounced that war is always an evil; Pierre Dubois said
explicitly, "Omne bellum in se malum et illicitum." I It was also stated
that permanent peace is the greatest of all blessings, and that society
thrives best in the tranquillity of universal peace; in the words of
Dante, "Genus humanum optime se habens quaedam concordia." 7
Yet how should peace be preserved? Dante wanted to gain universal
peace through the establishment of a universal monarchy. Pierre
Dubois rejected this idea, asserting that advocates of universal mon-
archy were of unsound mind, but proposed instead a congress of
princes to rule the affairs of Europe. Union and federation still com-
pete as alternative patterns of world organization; the political in-
ventiveness of mankind is undeniably small.
Dante pointed out that disputes between princes cannot be settled
because the litigants are equal in rank,' whereas the monarch is most
powerful and can impose his will to maintain peace. The idea of inter-
national military coercion was implicitly argued by Dante; there
would be no point in establishing a universal monarchy unless the
monarch has the power to eliminate aggression. He would preserve
5. EGGERT, STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER LANDFRIEDEN (1875) passim. For prece-
dents in ancient Greece, Rome, and the early Middle Ages, see DAVIES, THE PRODLEM Or
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1938) c. 2, and the literature quoted therein.
6. DuBoIs, DE RECUPERATIONE TERRE SANCTE, TRAiTP DE POLITIQUE GLNLPRALE
(Langlois' ed. 1891) 4.
7. DANTE, DE MONARCEJA (Moore's ed. 1916) c. 1, § 15.
8. Id. § 10.
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peace by virtue of his authority, to be sure, but this authority was to
be based on material strength superior to that of any other prince.
While Dubois argued that universal monarchy I could not lead to
peace--continuous wars would have to be waged to establish and
maintain the universal system-he recognized that the establishment
of his system in the contemporary world also would require a series of
preventive wars in the Holy Land, Italy and Germany. After pacifica-
tion, international cooperation was to be achieved by a lucrative asso-
ciation of the states in common enterprises for the colonization of the
Holy Land.
Within the league, peace was to be settled by arbitration, the Pope
being the supreme arbiter; the judges were to be appointed by papal
council. If peace was violated, the aggressor, called "bdllum ferens,"
was to be subdued by an international army formed from the troops
of all confederate states. Economic blockade was to be used as one
of the chief weapons. 0 No help was to be given to the aggressor popu-
lace which, after repression of its rebellion, was to be expropriated and
expelled from its territory and used for conquest and colonization of
the Holy Land. The aggressor was to be outlawed and prevented from
resuming the attack. Thus, universal peace was to be preserved through
four devices: confederation, economic association, arbitration and mili-
tary coercion.
TBE LATE MIDDLE AGES
The writings of Dante and Dubois had virtually no effect. Dubois
was soon forgotten, and even Dante whose treatise could have served as
a program for an expanding Imperial institution was almost totally
neglected. In the ideology of the medieval Imperium, the idea of
peace was little emphasized. The Holy Roman Empire became a mere
symbol for the unity of the Christian world. For short moments the
Empire took charge of the common defense of the Christian world
against the assaults of Arabs, M\'ongols, and Turks. But the eternal
struggle between the spiritual and temporal leader weakened both to
such an extent that both lost their authority. The Pope, depending
on the fluctuations of the Zeitgeist, was from time to time able to
arbitrate and mediate international disputes, but when Emperor
Sigismund tried, during the Council at Constance (1415), to rejuvenate
the Emperor-institution by transforming it into a supreme arbitration
authority and to mediate peace between France and England, 'he
9. On Dubois, see MEIER, DIE STAATS-UND VOELI.ERRECHTLICIIEN IDLEN VON
PETER DuBois (1908); Barroux, Pierre Dubois df ld Paix pcrp.'Uidle (France, 1933) 47
REVUE D'HIsToIRE DIPLOMATIQUE 232; Knight, A Mcdiacval Padf-s-Pirro Du Bois
(1924) 9 GROTIuS SocIETY TRANSACTIONS 1.
10. DUBOIS, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 5, at S. His ideas on enforcement were alko devel-
oped in DE ABREVlATioNE which was not available to the author.
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failed completely. Nevertheless, the Emperor ideology did not die ;'as
late as 1688, for example, Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, proposed that
the Emperor should arbitrate the disputes of Germany and Italy.
In the sphere of theoretical writings, there was for a long time no
development of the idea of peace enforcement, except in Marsiglio di
Padua's Defensor pacis which showed the connection between "democ-
racy" (or, more generally, society) and peace.
In 1462, George Pod~brad, King of Bohemia, under the influence of
the otherwise obscure pamphletist Antonius Marinus, proposed the
establishment of a European league." The nucleus of this league was
to be an alliance against the Turks between France under Louis XI,
Venice and Bohemia. (Constantinople had fallen nine years earlier.)
The suggested treaty authorized sanctions against the aggressor; the
victim of aggression was to be helped by all members of the confedera-
tion, which was to assume the initiative to settle disputes even among
states not belonging to it. Article VI stipulated the outlawing of any
individual who disturbed the peace; every aggressor was to be pun-
ished as a "violator of general peace." The right to declare war was no
longer to be exercised by individual states, but devolved upon the con-
federation as a whole.
4nother abortive attempt to preserve peace was made during the
early years of the 16th century. In 1517, Pope Leo X published a bull
ordering a general truce of five years.'2 Trying to follow the papal
recommendation, Frangois I of France, Henry VIII of England, and
Charles I of Spain (later Emperor Charles V) concluded, in October
1518, a convention to establish "universal peace." The Papal State
and the Church adhered to this alliance. If an aggression should occur,
diplomatic means were to be employed; if peaceful means should fail,
the confederates would, after the lapse of one month, declare them-
selves to be the enemies of the aggressor, and after the delay 6f a second
month, invade the aggressor's country. Every confederate was to pay
for his own expenses; the right of free passage was guaranteed. More-
over, the federation was open to everybody. Although conceived for
all future times, it fell apart one year after its conclusion when the
death of Emperor Maximilian secured Charles' ascension to the Im-
perial throne. It ended legally in 1521 when 'Cardinal Wolsey, one of
the fathers of the confederation, concluded a secret alliance with Charles
against France. There followed a series of devastating wars between
Charles and Frangois, two former "confederates."
11. SCHWTZKY, DER EUROPAEISCHE FUERSTENBUND GEORGS VON PODEBRAD. EIN
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In 1544, after the last war between Charles and Frangois, Guillaume
Postel published his book De Orbis Terrae Concordia Libri IV in which
he proposed a universal monarchy under France. 3
FRom CAMPAKELLA TO J.AUES IMADISON
The 17th century witnessed the publication of a number of peace
projects. The series was opened by Campanella's De .ilkmardzia
Hispanica Discursus, a treatise which resumed Dante's and Postel's
fundamental argument but placed the burden for the enforcement of
universal peace on Spain, then the most powerful country. (In Mo-
narchia Mlessiae, published in 1633, the Pope was chosen for the task.)
Spain should establish unity of faith and a united government-a
republic of all states with the Pope as its chief; if this were done, there
would be no schism, no heresy, no famine and no war.
In 1625, an anonymous statesman submitted to the Chancellor of
France, Etienne d'Aligre, a book titled "Le Calon du Si~cle, un conscil
salutaire d'un ancien mninistre d'Etat pour la conservation de la paix
universelle." In this book, the anonymous Frenchman, realizing that
one country will always be too weak to establish a universal system,
advocated a sort of a federal union between France and Spain. 4
In the same year, Grotius published "De jure belli ac pacis," where a
paragraph was devoted to our problem. It reads as follows:
". .. It would be useful and in some fashion necessary that the
Christian powers should make between themselves some sort of
body in whose assemblies the troubles of each should be determined
by the judgment of others not interested, and that there should be
sought means of constraining the parties to come to an agreement
under reasonable conditions." 15
In his Mimoires, written between 1617 and 1638, the Duc de Sully
alleged that Queen Elizabeth of England and King Henry IV of France
had elaborated a scheme for the maintenance of peace in Europe.
Whether Sully's report was historically accurate is immaterial. G Some
of the thoughts expressed in the scheme were probably not unfamiliar
to the two princes; it is certain that most European statesmen of later
periods were familiar with the project. The "Grand Design" suggested
that Europe should be divided equally among the powers in such a
manner that none of them could impose his will upon the others; no
state was to seek aggrandizement by conquest. The reallocation of
13. Id. at 378.
14. Id. at 397.
15. Quoted from RALsrox, INTERm.TiOvL AnlfimATioA'I rnou ATar,;S 'o Lcc, iu;o
(1929) 118-9.
16. Ibid.; also DAvIEs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 72-6. Tan GrnA, DEIGN, in the
version by the Abb6 de l'Ecluse des Loges, was reprinted by the Grotius Saciet,.
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land was to eliminate causes of international friction; this is an idea
which, 200 years later, was developed in its economic aspects by Fichte
in "Der geschlossene Handelsstaat." The European states were to be
ruled by a general council, to be named by the princes, including the
Emperor and the Pope. The council would have at its command mili-
tary and naval contingents to enforce its decisions and to preserve the
peace. "I dare maintain," wrote Sully, "that peace is the great and
common interest of Europe .. .The greater powers should force the
lesser into it, if necessary, by assisting the weak and oppressed; this is
the only use they ought to make of their superiority." 11 This state-
ment could have served as a motto of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.
In the period of the Thirty Years War, the organization of peace
was a widely discussed subject. Since that time, each major conflagra-
tion was accompanied by a flood of ideas about the art of "peacefare."
The treaties of Osnabrueck and Muenster reflected this tendency and
contained provisions to assure the stability and permanence of peace.
Paragraphs 114-116 of the Treaty of Muenster determined that any
-person breaking the convention or public peace, either intentionally or
in fact, would incur the punishment prescribed for such violations.
Despite violations, the peace would remain in force; all signatories to
the treaties were obligated to defend and protect each other as well as
the laws or conditions of the peace against whomever it might be, with-
out distinction of religion. If violations occurred, it was to be at-
tempted to settle the dispute by friendly means or legal procedures; if,
however, .after three years (sic) the dispute could not be settled by
peaceful means, all the interested parties were bound to help the vic-
tim." No attempt was ever made to apply these provisions in practice.
In 1693, William Penn, in his "Essay towards the Present and Future
Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Diet, Parlia-
ment or Estates" suggested the organization of an international tribunal
and a diet of the European Sovereigns.19 This tribunal was to settle
disputes which could not be resolved by diplomacy. "Refusal to refer
by one party or refusal to respect the decision subjected the offender
to the exercise of force by the others." 20 All the members of the Euro-
pean Parliament were to unite against the aggressor to "compel the
submission and performance of the sentence."
The end of the War of the Spanish Succession brought forth the
publication of one of the most renowned peace projects, the "Projet de
Paix Perpetuelle," by the Abb6 de Saint-Pierre.2 The Abb& was
17. SULLY, MEMOIRS, Book XIV. Quoted from VESTAL, THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
(1920) 288.
18. 1 LANGE, Op. Cit. supra note 12, at 497.
19. DAVIES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 77.
20. RALSTON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 120.
21. Ibid. This project was also reprinted by the Grotius Society.
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secretary of one of the French plenipotentiaries to the peace negotia-
tions, and since his book was published at Utrecht, it may be assumed
that he, or high persons behind him, tried to influence the proceedings.
In fact, copies of the book were distributed to members of the con-
ference. Saint-Pierre envisaged, like others before and after him, a
European senate or council, yet his project is interesting for the meth-
ods of coercion it suggested. In his Fundamental Article VIII we read
the following sentences:
"The Sovereign who shall take up arms before the Union has
declared war, or who shall refuse to execute a regulation of the
society, or a judgment of the Senate, shall be declared an enemy
to the society, and it shall make war upon him, 'till he be disarmed,
and 'till the judgment and regulations be executed. . . If after
the society is formed . . . , a Sovereign shall refuse to enter into
it, it shall declare him an enemy to the repose of Europe, and shall
make war upon him 'till he enter into it, or 'till he be entirely
dispossessed." 22
Saint-Pierre also attempted to determine the aggressor by defining
him as the sovereign who attacks suddenly or who refuses to conform
to the decisions of the Union. In his Fundamental Article IV, the
Abb6 linked peace clearly and unequivocally to the maintenance of the
status quo:
"All the sovereignties of Europe shall always remain in the con-
dition they are in, and shall always have the same limits that
they have now."
While Leibnitz commented favorably upon the project and con-
sidered it feasible, Frederick II of Prussia, writing to Voltaire, said,
"The thing is most practicable, for its success all that is lacking is the
consent of Europe and a few similar trifles." 23
There may have been no "consent" on the part of Europe, yet
Saint-Pierre's scheme became very well known during the 18th century.
It was known to Benjamin Franklin who may have had it in mind
when he proposed his Albany plan. During the Seven Years War,
Rousseau used the "Prrojet" to work out a peace plan of his own, calling
it "Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe," published between
1761 and 1782. Rousseau proposed that the powers should conclude
a perpetual and irrevocable alliance 2 4 and settle their differences by
arbitration or judgment; there was to be mutual guaranty of posses-
sions on the basis of the status quo; violators were to be put under the
22. Quoted from DAVIES, o. cit. supra note 5, at 81.
23. ALDixGTON, LETTERS OF VOLT.AiRE and FREDERIC THE GREAT (1927) 160 (Letter
of Apr. 12, 1742).
24. RALsTON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 121.
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ban of Europe as common enemies, and the confederation would be
entitled to enforce its rights. Rousseau's plan also contained a' veto
provision; the diet was to vote by majority, but the five fundamental
articles of the European constitution were not to be changed without
the unanimous consent -f all parties.
In America, the problem of coercion was thoroughly discussed by
the drafters of the Constitution. Both the so-called Virginia and New
Jersey plans contained provisions for enforcement against recalcitrant
states and against those members of the Union who should fail to ful-
fill their duty under the articles of the Constitution. 2 These proposals
met, however, the strenuous opposition of Madison and Hamilton.
Madison thought that force should not be applied to people collectively
but individually, and pointed out that enforcement would lead to war
and to the destruction of the Union. Speaking militarily, he observed,
"Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost enforce a
national decree against Massachusetts abetted perhaps by several
of her neighbors? It would not be possible. A small proportion of
the Community in a compact situation, acting on the defensive, and
at one of its extremities might at any time bid defiance to the
National authority." 2G
He called the idea that the central government could force its will upon
the states "visionary and fallacious." Hamilton added that foreign
powers would "not be idle spectators" during enforcement operations,
and summed up his opinion,
"To coerce the states is one of the maddest projects that was
ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a
single state. This being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard
a civil war?" 27
PRACTIcAL ATTEMPTS
During the 18th century, war was accepted as a matter of course.
Yet two political attempts at peace preservation deserve attention,
After the War of the Spanish Succession, the European cabinets
pursued a rigorous policy of peace and appeasement. This policy was
symbolized by Walpole, Fleury and Charles VI, statesmen who in
many respects presage the protagonists of the Mettemich and Cham-
berlain-Briand periods. The main danger of that time was the resump-
25. LowE, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN DIPLOM1ACY (unpublished manuscript) c. 1.
See also ScoTT, THE UNITED STATES OF AIERICA: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION (1920) 203 el seg. Compare TEE FEDERALIST Nos. 15 and, especially, 16. These same
arguments later played a major role in the Senate debate of 1919 concerning the League.
See FREEMAN, COERCION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1944).




tion of the fight between Austria and France for the Low Countries,
and England's preoccupation lest France should gain possession of
Belgium and Holland. To avoid a conflict in the Low Countries,
Britain, Austria and the States-General in 1715 signed a "Locamo"
treaty at Antwerp, called the Barrier Treaty.23 From our point of
view, the main stipulation was that part of the Austro-French frontier
was to be guarded by Dutch troops, acting as a sort of international
police. In order to preserve peace, Austria renounced the exercise of
full sovereignty in Belgium, and so permitted the permanent presence
of foreign troops on Belgian soil. Only on this condition did she enter
into legal possession of the country. However, the Dutch interna-
tional police never became operative. ".. .On the only occasion
when it was seriously wanted, in the War of the Austrian Succession,
the Dutch garrisons were withdrawn from the fortresses in 1745 in
order that the Dutch should preserve their neutrality." 0 For the
same reason there were no Dutch garrisons during the Seven Years
War, although they -were restored afterwards. In 1782, Emperor
Joseph II requested the Dutch to leave, which they did under protest,
although they had little choice in the matter as they needed the troops
for their own war with Great Britain. The history of the Dutch corps
is instructive as it points up some of the difficulties which may afflict
international forces in the future.
In 1717, an unforeseen danger menaced the peace of Europe-the
aggressive policy of Alberoni's Spain which aimed at the destruction
of the system created by the peace of Utrecht and more specifically at
the conquest of Sardinia, Sicily, and Southern Italy. Sardinia and
Sicily fell easily enough, but in 1718 the Utrecht powers (Britain,
France, Austria, and the United Netherlands) concluded an alliance,
promising each other mutual support in case of attacL Continued
Spanish aggression was forestalled by the annihilation of the Spanish
fleet off Cape Passaro by the British, acting without declaration of
war, in behalf of the Quadruple Alliance-a most successful "arche-
type" of peace enforcement action."0 It was perhaps this event which,
in 1736, led a now peaceful Cardinal Alberoni to propose a peace
project of his own in which military enforcement was to play a promi-
nent role.
THE HOLY ALLL-%NcE,
The most elaborate attempt at peace preservation prior to the 20th
century was undoubtedly the system which resulted from the liquida-
tion of the Napoleonic wars and which is wrongly kmon as the "Holy
28. MowAT, A HIsToRy oF EUROPEAN DIPLO,ACY, 1451-1789 (1923) 209.
29. Id. at 288.
30. Id. at 213.
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Alliance." This system was constructed on several levels and can be
understood only if it is considered in its complex totality.31
The basis of the system was the Holy Alliance proper, a treaty sug-
gested by Czar Alexander I and signed by all European states with the
exception of England, Turkey and the Papacy. Although "a piece of
sublime mysticism and nonsense" (Castlereagh) and so vague that it
can hardly be called a legal, let alone an enforceable, document, the
treaty precluded war between the legitimate sovereigns, or rather it
codified the fact that, under the circumstances, such war was a very
remote possibility. Article I stated that the signatory powers "will,
on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance."
Article II proclaimed that
"the sole principle of force, whether between the said Govern-
ments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other
reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the
mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to con-
sider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian
nation."
Goethe said about the Holy Alliance, "Nothing greater or more
beneficial for mankind was ever devised." 32 This statement becomes
more understandable 'if it is recalled that the Holy Alliance had been
designed by the Czar as a first but decisive step to the establishment of
a Confederation of Europe-an ideal which Alexander had taken from
Saint-Pierre and Rousseau with whose writings his tutor, La Harpe,
had made him familiar.
While the Holy Alliance bound the European states against un-
specified dangers, there was unanimity among the leading powers that
France was the country most likely to start a future war.33 Accord-
ingly, Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia signed a specific military
alliance to protect each other by intervention against French aggres-
sion. In 1818, France entered the alliance, thus signifying her purpose
to adhere to a policy of peace; to be protected against any eventuality,
the four original signatories renewed by a secret treaty their mutual
defense pact. This second level of Metternich's peace system was
called the Concert of Europe.
Under the impression of recent French history, continental states-
men of the time believed that revolution must inevitably engender
31. 3 ME31OIRS OF PRINCE METTERNICH, 1815-1829 (1881) 182-8; 4 id. at 638. Vari-
ous peace plans preceding the downfall of Napoleon, and others accompanying the activities
of the Holy Alliance, including some peace ideas of Napoleon himself, are briefly reviewed
in WYNNER and LLOYD, SEARCHLIGHT ON PEACE PLANS (1944).
32. VESTAL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 390.
33. Gentz, The Resdts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, reprinted in 3 METTERNICII,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 189.
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aggression. Any uprising or insurrection, especially when it led to the
dethronement of the legitimate ruler, signer of the Holy Alliance, was
considered a potential threat of war. Hence, if peace was to be pre-
served, revolutions had to be crushed. Of course, this was not the only
reason why Metternich and Alexander were opposed to revolution;
yet, grasping the intricate relationship between internal and external
peace, they acted to maintain both in order to preserve the internal
as well as the external status quo. This was the third level of the
system.
34
Metternich's experiences within the German Confederacy 35 led
him to believe that the treaties would be useless unless threats to
peace were terminated by immediate intervention. In July 1820, a
revolution broke out in Naples; by virtue of the pact of 1815, a con-
ference convened in Troppau at the end of which Austria, Russia and
Prussia-but neither France nor England-signed a protocol promul-
gating the principle of intervention for the maintenance of peace. The
text of the protocol is as follows:
"States which have undergone a change of government due to
revolution, the result of which threatens other states, ipso facto,
cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded
from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and
stability .... If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threat-
ens other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means,
or if need be, by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the
bosom of the Great Alliance." '
The three eastern powers were strongly opposed by England. Metter-
nich was unable to convince Castlereagh that the new principles were
merely the logical conclusion of the premises to which England was
already committed. Castlereagh's ansver -as that Britain could never
accept a principle which she would not permit to be applied in her
own case; England, he wrote,37 "cannot and will not act upon abstract
and speculative principles of precaution." Nevertheless, a breakdown
of the alliance was avoided; while objecting to intervention, England
admitted that Austria had special interests in Italy, and interposed no
objection to the Austrian enforcement which followed against Naples
and Piedmont. This solution was worked out in the Conference of
Laibach which was still in session when news arrived of the outbreak of
the Greek War of Independence. It was now Russia's turn to frustrate
intervention.
34. 3 METTERC c, op. cit. supra note 31, at 194.
35. Id. at 315.
36. 1 HAYEs, A POLITICAL AND CuLTuru%. HisToRY OF MODERIN EUnoP (1932) 733.
37. MAxN, SECRETARY OF EUROPE. THE LIFE OF FRIEDRacI GE%,rz, ENEt= oP NA-
POLEON (1946) 271.
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In 1822 a revolution in Spain necessitated a new conference, which
convened in Verona. The Czar offered to march 150,000 Russians to
Piedmont where they would serve as an international police against
revolutions in western Europe-a proposal rejected by all the other
states. Russia, Austria and Prussia agreed, however, to support France
in intervening in Spain; this intervention took place in 1823 and re-
established the legitimate monarchy.
Great Britain was afraid that the French intervention might serve
as a pretext for European powers to seize territory in South America.
In fact, it had been suggested at Verona that Spain should recover
some of her former possessions, but in addition there was an informal
understanding between France and Russia to take Buenos Aires and
establish naval control in the Pacific. England threatened immediate
war if France or Russia would attack South America, and communi-
cated with the American government which, shortly afterwards, pro-
claimed the Monroe Doctrine. The Verona conference also decided to
recall the enforcement contingents from Naples and Piedmont in order
to demonstrate clearly that the interventionists had no secret design
of annexing territory. Nevertheless, the "Congress system" was at its
end; Metternich had been unable to get acceptance of the enforcement
principle.
NAVAmINo
Yet while Metternich's system was dead, his idea lived on and soon
found an important application, this time in the interest of liberalism.
When the Greek insurrection broke out, Alexander, true to the prin-
ciples of the Holy Alliance, condemned the revolution, although it
had been prepared with Russian help. The Czar sympathized with the
Greeks and felt morally obliged to support them against the Sublime
Porte, not only for religious reasons but also because, apparently, he
was a member of the secret Greek organization which prepared the
uprising. As time went by, Russia foresook the Holy Alliance and
openly supported the Greeks; in 1827 the former Russian Foreign
Minister, Capo d'Istria, himself a Greek, was elected president of
Greece. While the powers were unwilling to permit Russian action
against Turkey, the Greeks, in a clever move of political warfare, put
themselves under British protection. Thereupon, Russia and Britain,
later joined by France, concluded the treaty of London (1827), re-
questing Turkey immediately to conclude an armistice, threatening
otherwise to support the Greeks. When the Turks refused, British,
French and Russian naval forces destroyed, in an international peace
enforcement action, the Egyptian-Turkish fleet at Navarino.11 Though
Turkey's naval power was thus broken, she was not ready to yield.
38. ERxum, SURPRIsE (1943) 46.
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England and France showed no intention for further intervention, but
Russia declared war and, in a hard campaign in which she almost suf-
fered defeat, advanced to Adrianople.
At that stage, of course, the war assumed an entirely different
character; the question was no longer Greek but Turkish independence.
Further Russian advances toward Constantinople would have com-
pelled Britain to intervene against Russia. The battle of Navarino
had greatly damaged British interests. The elimination of the Turldsh
fleet had upset the naval balance, thereby menacing British security.
When, after initial enthusiasm, this unexpected result became clear,
British public opinion was enraged. Admiral Codrington, the Com-
mander of the Allied intervention squadron, was recalled and a cabinet
crisis was barely avoided. Russia hastened to make peace with Turkey.
In Europe the basic principle of the Congress of Vienna, namely the
sacrosanctity of the status quo and legitimacy, had been violated by
the powers themselves. Navarino aided an individual revolution di-
rectly, and the dissonances of the European concert thereby revealed
indirectly strengthened the Continent's rebellious spirit, thus leading
to the revolutions of 1830 and those which followed. The weakening
of Turkey caused perpetual unrest in the Near East which, in the end,
culminated in the Crimean War. Metternich had been right when he
predicted that the emancipation of the Greeks would ". . consum-
mate a new revolution in Europe-a triumph the reaction of which on
the whole of Europe is far beyond our calculations; which would give
birth to a new era of war. . . .,
Metternich stated that with the maintenance of all legal rights
"alone can general peace be possible." 1 Peace is thus the preservation
of the status quo, which must be maintained by crushing all forces
liable or willing to upset existing conditions. Obviously, such a solution
must sooner or later lead to ultra-reaction and radically stifle political
progress. The Holy Alliance would have become an instrument of
"reaction" even if Metternich had been a "liberal." Castlereagh and
Canning were perfectly right on this point. Yet the British solution-
to intervene in order to remedy dangerous situations and to help op-
positional movements in securing their "justified" objectives-must
create further unrest, call forth revolutions, and upset the equilibrium
between powers. Metternich's system would lead to stagnation and to
arbitrary tyranny among and within the states; Canning's system to
perpetual revolution, hence to international conflict and, in its logical
culmination, to continuous wars.
39. 4 ME=TERmcr, op. cit. supra note 31, at 387.
40. Id. at 638.
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BEGINNING OF PACIFISM
The unsatisfactory results of peace enforcement were too obvious to
be ignored. Under the influence of Bentham's posthumous writings
which admitted the necessity of peace enforcement only as a "last
resource," many relied upon public opinion as an instrument of peace.
Nor was the idea of peace enforcement part of the doctrine of the
emerging pacifist movement led by Elihu Burritt, Richard Cobden,
August Visscher, and Victor Hugo. In 1835 a movement started in
the Senate of Massachusetts to settle international disputes by arbitra-
tion-similar proposals were made in 1849 in France by Bouvert and in
England by Cobden and Hobhouse, and defeated in both countries.41
Palmerston opposed Cobden's motion on the ground that "without a
sufficiently large army, the arbitral tribunal would be no more than a
mediation." Yet the idea of peace enforcement all but vanished from
literature and public discussion. The idealistic phase of the pacifist
movement had begun.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
In actual practice, however, peace enforcement was not entirely dis-
continued. Significantly, ,it was exclusively employed against weak
countries. In 1832, Franco-British land and naval forces intervened
against Holland to secure Belgium's independence. In 1835, England
and France blockaded the Argentine coast; ten years later, in order to
check expansionist tendencies of Argentina against Uruguay, French
and British troops occupied the latter country and blockaded the
Rio de la Plata. In 1854, France and Britain occupied the Piraeus to
prevent Greece from attacking Turkey, then at war with Russia. In
1880, a naval demonstration by the powers settled troubles between
Montenegro and Turkey. In 1886, international naval forces blockaded
the Greek coast and compelled the Greeks to disarm and not to attack
Turkey. Ten years later, in 1896, the Armenian massacres led to a
British proposal for intervention, but Russia declined to join in the
action and prepared instead to seize Constantinople and the Straits
should the intervention take place-an interesting indication of the
complications which might result from peace enforcement.
In 1897, an insurrection in Crete threatened to cause civil war in
Macedonia; the powers requested both Greece and Turkey to with-
draw their troops on pain of "measures of constraint"; rejection of the
note was answered by blockade and occupation of the island. The
island remained occupied, and while the occupation still lasted, a new
uprising occured in 1905, the insurrectionists claiming union with
Greece. This union was opposed by the powers, yet after the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908, the union was pro-
41. KREHBIEL, NATIONALISm, WAR AND SOCIETY (1916) 160.
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claimed by Crete; ten months later, the powers withdrew; they had
been unable to impose the will of "Europe."
In 1900, an international army was sent to China to repress the
Boxer rising. Taken by itself, the intervention was successful; yet it
gave the Russians an opportunity to occupy Manchuria, an event
which was the chief cause of the Russo-Japanese War. The interven-
tion, therefore, remotely caused the Russian revolution of 1905 and
the emergence of Japan as a world power.
In 1913, the coasts of Montenegro were blockaded in order to raise
the siege of Scutari. Although Montenegro was one of the weakest
countries in the world, it defied the powers and took Scutari; only a
threat by Austria to intervene on land compelled it to yield.
In addition to these actions, there were some others which, though
ostensibly carried out for the cause of peace, actually had different
motivation. There was the intervention against Mohammed Ali of
Eggypt in 1840 which put an end to his quarrel with the Sultan and
compelled him to return the Turkish fleet to Turkey, but which had
the more important result that it strengthened England's position in
the eastern Mediterranean and redressed the naval balance that had
been upset at Navarino. In October 1848, the Russians, in agreement
with the Turks, occupied the Danubian principalities which had be-
come rebellious; Russian forces stayed until 1851. In 1849, a revolu-
tion broke out in Hungary; the Czar's offer of help was accepted by
the Austrian Emperor and Russian and Austrian forces crushed the
rebellion.
THE HAGuE PERIOD
During the last quarter of the 19th century, the peace movement had
indeed gained ground. While previously peace was a purely negative
condition, namely the absence or interruption of war, it now became,
to an ever increasing extent, the supreme objective of statecraft, at
least in some countries. True, when Nicholas II of Russia invited the
powers to the First Peace Conference at the Hague, he had very good
domestic and military reasons to propose disarmament-new and
superior Austrian ordnance equipment had temporarily put Russia
in an inferior position. 42 At the same time, Bismarck's system of
alliances and re-assurance agreements, which for more than 20 years
had prevented war through the isolation of France, the most likely
aggressor in the post-1870 system, had broken down. But Nicholas
took his inspiration in part from Alexander's Holy Alliance. He was
also greatly influenced by Secretary Blaine's success with the First Pan-
American Congress and by the writings of I. S. Bloch. Yet while the
Hague Conference is an important milestone in history because it
42. PARES, A HISTORY or RUSSI. (1944) 417.
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codified a large body of international law, it failed in its primary pur-
pose, which was to initiate disarmament and to construct an inviolable
system of peace. The first decennium of the 20th century witnessed a
series of armament races and international crises and also a number of
wars, one of major importance. The futility of the system of "volun-
tary arbitration" agreed to at the Hague was obvious; only minor con-
flicts were submitted to arbitration (the treaties stipulated that ques-
tions of honor, independence, and vital interests could not be arbi-
trated). People began to look to other methods; the idea of peace
enforcement was reborn after almost eighty years of advocacy of non-
violence.
It is, for reasons of space, impossible to enumerate even the names
of those who, in one form or other, suggested an international police
as executive organ of the international court. They include distin-
guished international jurists like Bluntschli, economists like Irving
Fisher, soldiers, and participants of the Madrid Congress of the Ibero-
American Union (1900).13
As far as we can see, the first person of outstanding international
stature to bring up the idea of peace coercion in the present century
was Theodore Roosevelt, proponent of the "international sheriff." He
spoke of such a scheme in a message to Congress in 1904, and, in an
address delivered to the Nobel Prize Committee at Oslo, in 1910 he
advocated a forceful combination of "those great nations which sin-
cerely desire peace." 44
In June of the same year, a resolution was submitted to Congress by
Mr. Bartholdt from Missouri and Mr. Bennet from New York, and
received the consent of both Houses; to limit armaments, mankind
was invited ". . . to consider the expediency . . . of constituting the
combined navies of the world in an international force for the preserva-
tion of universal peace, . . .. 41
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Shortly after the outbreak of the World War, the idea of peace coer-
cion made new headway. Theodore Roosevelt re-stated his position;
Hamilton Holt suggested a league endowed with force for the adminis-
tration of sanctions; the Dutchman, Hendrik Dunlop,4" published a
43. Most pre-World War I proposals were collected in a booklet issued by the Dutch
publishing house Martinus Nijhoff, WAR OBVIATED BY AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE (Van
Vollenhoven's ed. 1915). The first solid, though short, discussion of peace coercion was
published by DUMAS, LEs SANCTIONS DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL (1905).
44. Quoted from SCHUmAN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM
IN TRANSITION (1941) 211.
45. 45 CONG. REc. part 8, 8545 (1910). See also two pre-war American publications:
SMITH, AMERIcANISm CONQUERS PANICS, SOCIALxSM AND WAR (4th ed. 1913); ELIOT, AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST SUPPORT AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL (1914).
46. DUNLOP, ALS DE VREDE KOMT (1914).
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little book in which he suggested that an "international gendarmerie"
ought to be established with a strength of one per cent of the popula-
tion, with contingents in every country; 25 per cent of the contingents
were to consist of police troops, native to the territory where the con-
tingents were located. In 1915, a symposium was published in the
Hague which contained more than a dozen authoritative statements
about the practicability and advisability of an international force; the
book attracted world-wide attention.
47
The idea of peace coercion found a particularly good reception in the
United States where a "League to Enforce Peace" was created under
the leadership of former President Taft and A. Lawrence Lowell,
President of Harvard University. 3 At a conference in Philadelphia in
June 1915, a program was adopted which called for compulsory arbi-
tration and the application of economic and military force by all states
against any state resorting to war without submitting its disputes
to pacific settlement.
PRELIMINARIES TO THE LEAGUE
During the discussions about the Covenant of the League of Nations,
Clemenceau and Leon Bourgeois, the delegates of France, suggested
that the League be provided with a powerful executive. In some form
or other, most drafts for the Constitution of the League envisaged
military sanctions, e.g., the plans of Phillimore, Smuts, Cecil, and
Hurst-Miller, the German and Italian schemes, the project of the
League to Enforce Peace, and that of the Fabian Society.42 The
French plan, which was the most elaborate, dealt with military sanc-
tions in the following manner:
"The execution of the military sanctions on land or at sea shall
be entrusted either to an international force or to one or more
Powers, members of the League of Nations, to whom a mandate
in that behalf shall be given.
"The International Body shall have at its disposal a mili-
tary force supplied by the various member States of sufficient
strength: (I) to secure the execution of its decisions and those of
the international tribunal; (II) to overcome in case of need, any
forces which may be opposed to the League of Nations in the
event of armed conflict." '0
47. WAR OBVIATED BY AN IBTERNAIOiNAL POLICE, loc. d. supra note 43.
48. BARTLETT, THE LEAGUE To ENFORCE PEACE (1944) passim. This bok deals alo
with American pre-war pacifist activities, including proposals for international forceo, and
later American developments connected with the founding of the League of Nations. See
also MARBURG, DEVELOPMENT Or THE LEAGUE OF NATIOs IDE. (1932); HFumsLEri,
PLANS FOR WORLD PEACE THROUGH SIX CENTURIES (1943).
49. DAVIES, op. cil. supra note 5, app. E, at 726-31.
50. Id. at 731-4.
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The strength of the international force and the national contingents
was to be fixed by the "International Body." The League army was
to be distributed over the globe and to be commanded by a permanent
general staff of the League. The activities of national armies were to be
controlled by the League, which had the right "at any time to require
that the member states introduce any alteration into their national
system of recruiting which the staff may report to be necessary."
To be sure, this idea had been conceived by Clemenceau as a device
to improve France's military security; because, fully aware of France's
inner weakness, the French leader wanted to prevent British and
American disarmament which he foresaw and dreaded. Whatever the
motivation might have been, President Wilson refused to discuss the
project on the ground that "the United States would never ratify any
treaty which put the force of the United States at the disposal of such
group or body." The idea that, instead of a League army, the member
states should put troops at the League's disposal, was equally vetoed by
Wilson. "The only method lies in our having confidence in the good
faith of the nations who belong to the League." 51
THE COVENANT
It is in the nature of things that an all-embracing international treaty
designed for the maintenance of peace must contain some stipulation
about unified action in case of aggression. In spite of Anglo-American
abhorrence against obligations which might commit them to military
action under unforeseen circumstances, the Covenant contained, in
addition to several random references, Articles 10 and 16 which deal
with peace enforcement. Article 10 was almost entirely of American
origin and was, incidentally, one of the chief reasons why the Senate
refused to ratify the Covenant. It reads as follows:
"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation
shall be fulfilled."
In Article 11 any war or threat of war was declared to be "a matter of
concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that
may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."
It is hardly necessary to belabor the vagueness of these articles; yet,
speaking legally, this very vagueness would have entitled the Council
to advise even military coercion. However, while in domestic politics
51. SCHWARZSCHILD, WORLD IN TRANCE. FROM VERSAILLES TO PEAmL HARDOR (1942)
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few governments will hesitate to take the fullest possible advantage of
all the rights conferred upon them by law, in international treaties
general authorizations, such as Article 10 of the Covenant, carry no
weight; their loop-holes are interpreted so as to permit a policy of
"wait and see." The framers of the Covenant felt this themselves and,
making a concession to the French proposal, included Article 16, which
stated that any aggressor should be "deemed to have committed an act
of war against all other Members of the League"; to oppose the ag-
gressor, the League was to order economic sanctions. Article 16 stipu-
lated clearly that these economic sanctions were to be complete, that
is to say, that all trade or financial relations were to be severed and
that all financial, commercial or personal intercourse was prohibited.
According to the mandatory language of this Article the imposition
of only partial sanctions, as occurred in 1936, was excluded, although
it could be justified by various other Articles and, in practice, by the
unanimity rule. In addition to economic sanctions, Article 16 envis-
aged the use of military power. The pertinent paragraph follows:
"It shall be the duty of the Council ... to recommend to
the several governments concerned what effective military, naval
or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute
to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the
League."
Attention must be called to the fact that this article, in a very indirect
and oblique manner, speaks of armed forces for the protection of the
League covenants, hence of an international force. On the other
hand, the article did not direct that military force was to be used
against the aggressor. Nor were the conditions determined wherein
the Council would have been obliged to recommend military coercion.
Moreover, the seemingly forceful wording of Article 16 was voided by
Article 5 which stipulated that the Council could make recommenda-
tions only upon unanimous approval. In practice, therefore, the
Council was prevented from recommending military sanctions.
The League was not entirely unsuccessful; out of 66, it settled 35 in-
ternational disputes. It was able to settle disputes if and when both
litigants wanted to accept the arbitration awards and if and when, as
in the Swedish-Finnish conflicts about the Aalands Islands, they did
not exploit their disputes as a pretext for aggression. When, however,
one country was determined and able to carry out aggressive plans, the
League was powerless and usually ended up by pronouncing Solomon-
like judgments which legalized the aggressor's conquest. An example
was the occupation of Vilna by Poland, in connection vith which an
abortive attempt was made to create an intemational force to super-
vise a plebiscite; the idea was quickly dropped when Russia, at that
time not a member of the League, declared that the presence of an
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international army close to its borders would constitute a casus belli.
Apparently the Kremlin did not believe that peace enforcement could
ever be made for the sake of peace alone.
After Japan's occupation of Manchuria, the Lytton report was
unanimously adopted by the League's General Assembly. This report
was fair enough to Japan, and it recommended no sanctions. Neverthe-
less, Japan rejected it, left the League, and continued its campaign of
conquest, undaunted by the condemnation of "public opinion."
The League also intervened in the Chaco conflict by declaring a
weapons' embargo against the belligerents. The embargo 'was later
lifted from Bolivia, but maintained against the aggressor Paraguay;
this did not prevent Paraguay from winning the war. The symbolic
sanctions against Italy in 1935-36 failed to stop the aggression but, by
strengthening Mussolini's domestic position, breaking the Stresa front,
driving Italy into the arms of Germany, and demonstrating the ir-
resolution and utter impotence of the Western Powers, paved the way
for later Axis aggression on a world-wide scale.1
2
ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEAGUE
The refusal of the United States to ratify the League of Nations and
to enter into a security agreement with Great Britain and France, left
France in a very precarious military position. Great Britain, feeling
that her own security was intimately linked to that of France, opened
negotiations for a mutual security pact. These negotiations soon en-
countered difficulties; yet as other nations also were interested in
security, the discussions were transferred to the League. In 1922, the
third assembly of the League adopted the famous Resolution XIV
which called for a defensive treaty open to all countries and based
upon a plan of military and mutual defense. Accordingly, the draft
"Treaty for Mutual Assistance" was submitted to the Assembly in
1923. It suggested a general pact supplemented by regional military
agreements; the Council was to determine the military forces which
each member was to provide in case of aggression and was to appoint a
commander-in-chief under whose orders the military contingents were
to fight. The draft was not favorably received. Strongest opposition
was made by the British (Conservative) government which made the
objection, among others, that the unanimity rule would paralyze the
Council and dangerously delay its intervention.
In view of this criticism, a new document was prepared which be-
came known as the "Geneva Protocol," and whose official title was
"Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes." The
52. For these and various other cases, see CAR, INTERNATIONAL RELATXONS SINCE
THE PEACE TREATIES (1943) 103 ef seq. For a complete survey of League disputes, including
statistics of success and failure, see 2 WRiGHT, A STUDY OF WAR (1942) 1429-31.
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Protocol was to make possible implementation of the disarmament
provisions of the Covenant. The disarming states were to be assured
that the reduction of armaments would not impair their security. The
Covenant had proclaimed the "moral solidarity of the new era," but
it had failed to provide for compulsory arbitration or effective inter-
national jurisdiction. The Protocol, essentially a proposal for the
amendment of the Covenant, was to remedy this "great omission of the
Covenant" (Dr. Benes). 3 It was also to correct the previous draft
Treaty which had conferred too much discretionary power upon the
Council, particularly with respect to the determination of the ag-
gressor. It was felt that the aggressor should not be determined ad hoc,
on the basis of actually existing circumstances, but according to gen-
eral criteria previously established in a binding legal form.' The Pro-
tocol is an ingenious piece of work, and still remains a most logical
plan for the elimination of war.
The basis of the Protocol was an agreement between all signatory
states "in no case to resort to war" (Article 2) and, for certain cases, to
"recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement,
the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice"
(Article 3). Cases not covered by the Statute of the Court were to be
submitted to the Council. Failing unanimous decision (minus the
votes of the litigants), the Council was to appoint a committee of
arbitrators whose recommendations were to be binding (Article 4,
paragraphs 2, 3, and 6). The Assembly, too, was entitled to arbitrate
disputes by majority vote, or if no majority could be obtained, to remit
the case to arbitration (Article 6). In case of dispute, as well as before
and during proceedings for pacific settlement, the quarreling states
were to abstain from taking "any measure of military, naval, air,
industrial or economic mobilization, nor, in general hny action of a
nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute" (Article 7).
The Council was entitled to investigate and inquire into any complaint
arising from this provision and to "decide upon the measures to be
taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation of a nature to
threaten the peace of the world" (Article 7). Moreover, it was recom-
mended that the litigants create demilitarized zones between their
forces and place them under the Council's supervision (Article 9).
The Protocol then proceeded to define the aggressor (Article 10):
"Every State which resorts to war in violation of the under-
takings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an
aggressor. Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarized zone
shall be held equivalent to resort to war. In the event of hostilities
having broken out, any State shall be presumed to be an aggressor,
53. MILLER, TEE GENEVA PROTOCOL (1925) 201; NoEL-.BAKn, TaE GEunVAi. Pno-
TOCOL (1925); WEHBERG, Tam OuT_.AWRy OF WNAR (1931) 26-32.
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unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken unanimously,
shall otherwise declare.
"If the Council does not at once succeed in determining the
aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an
armistice, and shall fix'the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds
majority, and shall supervise its execution. Any belligerent which
has refused to accept the armistice or has violated its terms shall
be deemed an aggressor."
This was a masterly way to preserve the unanimity rule and yet to
enable the Council to act if no unanimous decision could be reached.
Whatever the merits of the conflict or the interests and policies of the
Council's members, it is obligated to enforce an armistice and thereby
to terminate hostilities in a practical, though not in a legal, manner.
Moreover, it was mandatory to designate as aggressor any state which
did not comply with the armistice terms; no unanimity rule applied for
the determination of armistice violations. That it might be open to
interpretation whether or not a state complied with the Council's
orders, is another question; no provision was made for the voting
procedure should any disagreement develop with respect to this point.
Once the aggressor had been determined, the Council was to "call
upon the signatory States to apply forthwith against the aggressor the
sanctions provided by Article 11 of the present Protocol." These sanc-
tions were those of Article 16 of the Covenant, but Article 12 of the
Protocol prescribed that, to avoid improvisation, effective plans for
economic and financial sanctions should be drawn up in advance.
Article 13 specified the nature of military sanctions. According to this
article,
"The Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from
States determining in advance the military, naval, and air forces
which they would be able to bring into action immediately to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations in regard to sanctions
which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol ...The
said States may, in accordance with any agreements which they
may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a par-
ticular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military,
naval and air forces."
Although a considerable strengthening of the Covenant's Article 16,
this Article still left to the individual states the right to determine for
themselves the strength of their contingents.
Other shortcomings may be reviewed briefly. In a report of the
British delegates to the Prime Minister, it was explained how, by
preserving the unanimity rule, action could still be guaranteed by
making the test of aggression automatic and "presuming" a certain
state to be the aggressor; this "presumption .. .is to hold good until
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the Council has made a unanimous decision to tw contrary. If the
presumption stands it is considered sufficient to justify the application
of sanctions." 54 This solution, it was claimed, eliminated the difficulty
of a "procedure by a majority vote" which "might have resulted in a
State being obliged to apply sanctions against its own judgment."
However, it can be readily seen that it did no such thing; if a state
believed that sanctions were injurious to its own interests, it might
not obey the injunctions of the Council whether the attacking nation
were "deemed" or merely "presumed" to be the aggressor. The obliga-
tions of the Protocol were, in the words of Dr. Benes, "imperfect
obligations in the sense that no sanctions are provided for against any
party which shall have failed loyally and effectively to co-operate in
protecting the Covenant and resisting every act of aggression." 55
This is, of course, the crtux of the whole matter; the problem of peace
coercion reappears on a higher level. Yet on this level this problem
can be "solved" only by ignoring the non-cooperative state-in which
case there would be no coercion, or by presuming it to participate in
aggression-in which case sanctions would have to be applied against
it. But then the original aggressor would be gratuitiously provided
with an ally.
The Protocol contained no provisions for the maintenance of basic
military strength. The possibility that under conditions of general
disarmament as well as under other conditions the aggressor may be
the strongest power was not considered. Nor was it taken into account
that surprise attack may make possible the rapid and cheap execution
of territorial conquest by the aggressor. Like other peace projects, the
Protocol sanctified the status quo."o
On the other hand, if a majority of the signatory powers had become
opposed to the existing international arrangement, aggression might
have been approved by the Council. In 1914, for example, Germany
demanded that France, as a token of her peaceful intentions, should
permit German troops to occupy Toul and Verdun, the t,.o strongest
fortresses in the French defense belt. A Council which is in favor of
the aggressor might impose similar terms on the victim country on the
ground that non-compliance with the "just" demands of the attacker
constitutes aggression.
Austen Chamberlain pointed out that the discontinuation of military
preparations and activity during settlement proceedings would fre-
quently benefit the aggressor. Before starting his operations, he might
arrange his time-tables in such a manner that compliance with the
54. MILLER, THE GENEVA PROTOCOL (1925) 244.
55. Id. at 199.
56. For a justification of status quo treaties, see DE ILD,%RIAGA, DisAnmA_=rzr (1929)
pass m, particularly at 130.
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Council's request would not weaken, but further increase, his striking
power. By contrast, the victim, not having expected the onslaught,
would have made no preparations. The perpetuation of this condition
during the "cooling-off period" would actually penalize the victim
country. Alternatively, by resisting such a development, the victim
country might technically become an aggressor. Furthermore, as
Bismarck and Hitler have shown, the victim often can be forced to
make the first attack.
Whatever the merits or dE merits of the Protocol, it never came to
life. England under the Labor Government had already voiced its
opposition to the principles laid down in the document. Ramsay
MacDonald took the position that "our interests for peace are far
greater than our interests in creating a machinery of defense. A machin-
ery of defense is easy to create but beware lest in creating it you destroy
the chances of peace." 57 He pleaded confidence in human nature but,
as Jules Cambon rightly commented, the British Prime Minister forgot
Pascal's word that justice without force is powerless. 8 At any rate,
the Labor Government was soon succeeded by a Conservative Govern-
ment which took the attitude that it could not accept an unlimited
obligation of arbitration in its own disputes and would not ask other
nations to accept such an obligation-an attitude which is reminiscent
of Castlereagh's opposition to Metternich.
To replace the Protocol, Chamberlain suggested that those nations
whose conflicts and differences were most likely again to lead to war
should bind themselves not to attack each other and to submit their
disputes to arbitration. This suggestion was the origin of the Locarno
pact.
59
THE FRENCH PROPOSALS OF 1932
Despite these setbacks, the idea of military peace enforcement con-
tinued to be discussed. In 1929, Nicolas Politis declared in the Prepara-
tory Disarmament Commission0 that the establishment of an inter-
national force was an essential prerequisite for the reduction of arma-
57. 20 ENCYC. BRIT. (1944) 265.
58. Article Security, 20 ENcYc. BRIT. (15th ed. 1944) 265.
59. Various attempts to amend the Covenant and to establish world security (e.g.,
the pact of Paris, the Litvinov Protocol, the "model treaties," the Convention for Improv-
ing the Means of Preventing War, etc.) are described in WHIEELER-BENNETT, DISAnmA-
MENT AND SEcuRITY SINCE LocARNo 1925-1931 (1932). Lack of enforcement power was
viewed as the fundamental weakness of the League; see SCHMITT, DIE KERNFRAGIE DES
VOELKERBUNDES (1926). In 1927, a newspaper campaign for the establishment of interna-
tional forces was waged in England by Sir Sidney Low and Lord Thomson. See also,
SPAIGHT, PSEUDO-SECURITY (1928); JESSUp, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL
POLIcE (1928).
60. LoOSLI-USTEIu, GESCHICHTE DER KONFEREN FUER DIE HERABSETZUNO UND DIE
BEGRENZUNG DER RUESTUNGEN, 1932-1934; EIN POLITISCHER WELTSPIEGEL (1940) 37.
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ments. An international association of airplane pilots submitted a
memorandum in which it was stated that the majority of fliers would
prefer to serve in a common air force for the maintenance of peace
instead of becoming "executioners in war." In 1930, Lord David
Davies published his book, The Problem of the Twentieth Century,
wherein he argued with an imposing array of historical facts that
peace cannot be preserved except by an international police. In Sep-
tember 1931, Poland, in an official communication to the Preparatory
Disarmament Commission, suggested the creation of an international
army.
At the beginning of the Disarmament Conference, France again
came forward with a plan for an international armed force which was
to secure peace and disarmament. The proposal was presented by
Andr6 Tardieu on February 5, 1932.1 It envisaged:
"1. An international police force to prevent war.
"2. A first contingent of coercionary forces to repress war, and
to bring immediate assistance to any State victim of aggression."
The police force was to be ". . . permanently available with com-
plete freedom of passage to occupy in times of emergency areas where
a threat of war has arisen . .. ";012 it was to be composed of con-
tingents furnished by each of the contracting parties. It was a special
feature of the French project that offensive weapons, such as heavy
artillery, warships with a displacement exceeding 10,000 tons, heavy
bombers and large submarines, were no longer to be part of national
armaments but were to be put at the exclusive disposal of the inter-
national police. Civil aviation was to be internationalized under the
League's control.
The French proposal received a very cool reception. The liberal
English paper, Manchester Guardian, suggested that it had been
put forward in order to wreck the Disarmament Conference.3 How-
ever, in the discussions of the Conference, the representatives of many
countries considered the proposals as theoretically sound, albeit im-
practical. Only Maxim Litvinoff, Russian Foreign Commissar, at-
tacked the idea as such and tried to prove its futility. An international
police force, so he stated, would neither prevent war nor offer effective
assistance to the victim of aggression. In the 'past, no aggressor ever
desisted from his projects merely because he had to fight several na-
tions. So it will remain in future. It is all a question of relative strength.
The international police cannot be very strong-a few hundred thou-
and men against the millions of a strong aggressive nation; hence the
61. DAVIES, op. cit. supra note 5, app. M, at 785 el seq.
62. Ibid.
63. LoosLI-UsTERI, op. cit. supra note 60, at 40.
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aggressor will only have to modify his strategy so as to protect himself
against sanctions. After having made several critical remarks about
the League's ability to determine the aggressor or to assist victims of
aggression, Litvinoff showed concern that the nation which, by virtue
of its alliances, agreements or general influence, came to dominate the
League might use the international police for its exclusive benefit-a
circumlocution for his fear that the League army might lead an attack
against the Soviet Union.
6 4
Shortly afterwards the French dropped the project for which, in
November 1932, they substituted another,.presented by Herriot, aim-
ing at the establishment of national defense forces of a "uniform gen-
eral type," viz., short-service armies with limited effectives. Herriot's
proposal-also envisaged that
"Each of the contracting Powers will place permanently at the
disposal of the League of Nations, as a contingent for joint action, a
small number of specialized units consisting of troops serving a rela-
tively long term and provided with the powerful materials pro-
hibited for the national armies . . . these specialized contingents
will be kept constantly ready for action." 65
This proposal contained an idea which recently was put forward, in a
somewhat similar form, by the Acheson report on international atomic
control; it continued:
"Any mobile land material which is prohibited for the national
armies . . . will be stored in each of the contracting States under
international supervision. These stocks will, if necessary, be placed
at the disposal of the parties in aid of which collective action is
taken . . . Supervision will involve an investigation at least
once a year."
Like Metternich's system, the plan contained security provisions to
be carried out on different levels-general obligations to be assumed
by all signatories, and continental and regional arrangements, the
obligations becoming increasingly strong and more definite as the area
is narrowed.
Hitler's ascension to power put an end to all discussions about inter-
national organization; .for all practical purposes, the Disarmament
Conference transformed itself into a conference about German Gleich-
berechtigung. Although the discussion continued on a literary plane,
64. Id. at 42.
65. DAvIEs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 797. For the reaction of a revisionist country, see
CimBALi, L'ESPANSIONE GUERRESCA, IL DISARMO, LE RIPARAZIONI E L'ESERCITO INTERNA-
ZIONALE DI ANDREA TARDIEU (1932). A general Nazi interpretation is given by the German
delegate to the Disarmament Conference, former Undersecretary of State, RHEINmABi.N,
UM EIN NEUES EUROPA, TATSACHEN UND PROBLEME (1939) 178 et seg., 276 el seg.
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with a particular emphasis on the capabilities of an international air
force, the idea of peace enforcement was abandoned as a practical
possibility when France, in 1933, refused the Polish Marshal Pilsudski's
proposal to intervene against German rearmament, and when, in 1936,
England was unwilling to honor the Locarno Pact against the re-
occupation of the Rhineland. Officially, the idea of peace coercion did
not re-appear prior to the Conference of Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.1
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The Charter reveals the effort that has been made to avoid some
shortcomings of the Covenant and the Geneva Protocol, although not
all the strong points of these documents were salvaged. The new docu-
ment shows weaknesses of its own. From the point of view of peace
enforcement, the Charter has fewer "teeth" than the Protocol and the
French proposals of 1932.
The outstanding feature of the Charter is the authority that it
bestows upon the Security Council. It is stipulated that the Security
Council shall "be able to function continuously" (Article 28). The
United Nations "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf" (Article 24). "The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter" (Article 25). This
sweeping provision implies that a country may be obliged to abide by a
decision to which it was no party, and which runs counter to its inten-
tions and interests.
The Council is entitled to investigate any international dispute and
66. The literature for the period between the Disarmament and the San Francikco
Conferences includes the following works: AN, I-rRATio.AL Ar FoncE, ITs Fumcino.;s
AND ORGAmZATION (Memorandum submitted by Exec. Com., Int'l Cong. in Defense of
Peace, Brussels, Feb. 1934). LAwsoN, A PL IN FOR THE ORG.NizATIO.zo; OF A EUROPMEN Ain
SERVICE (1935); VERBERG, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLIC=nG (1935);
THouAs, AN INTEPNATIONAL POLICE FORCE (1936); MUIiprORD, Hm.IAcT, Axrrov.Wn AD
WAR (1936); CARDONA, LE PERIL EXTERiEuR; ou, Tous coiTRE un (1939); DAvy, AIM
POWER AND CIVILIZATION (1941); AR POWER IN THE PosT-AWAR WORLD (A plan prepared
by the Military Research Committee of the New Commonwealth, 1943); BEDFoD, TorAL
DisA NT OR AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE (1944); Richmond, Poicing t e Seas
in THE NEW COmiONWEALTH (1944); NEW COiuO.WEALTH SociLrr, THE Fuz;cnoi;s
OF AN INTERNATION.4L AIR POLICE (1944); Wright, Constitutional Procedure in the United
Statesfor carrying out Obligationsfor Military Sanctions (1944) 38 An. J. ItzT. L. 673; Biz,-
ER GE, THE PRICE OF PEACE (1945) SO c se q.; ALT!IN, THE INTErT;,IoNAL PoLICE &ND
WORLD SECU RrY (1945). In many of his writings, R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, prezident
of the Pan-Europe Union, proposed the creation of a Federal European armed force. There
are also several books written on the subject by Lord Davies. A bibliography, which,
however, is far from being complete, is contained in Johnson, Internmaior Pol ice Force
(1944) 17 THE REFERENcE SHELF No. 2.
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even any situation-note the widening of scope-either by its own
initiative, or upon invitation or complaint of any member or non-
members. The General Assembly "may call the attention of the
Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger interna-
tional peace and security" (Article 11, paragraph 3). Yet "while the
Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly
shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or
situation unless the Security Council so requests" (Article 12).
This virtually unlimited authority of the Security Council stands in
marked contrast to the weakness of the General Assembly which has
merely the responsibility "to discuss, debate, reveal, expose, lay open-
to perform, that is to say, the healthful and ventilating functions of a
free deliberative body, without the right or duty to enact or legislate." 11
With less verbiage it could be said that the General Assembly has no
rights and but one duty-to talk, and it may discharge that duty
during international disputes only if the Security Council grants per-
mission (Article 12). The Security Council, as the executive, has no
legislative counterpart; it has to make the laws itself, but in many
instances it has also to act as the judiciary---a construction without
checks and balances which runs counter to democratic-liberal ideas,
but which is consistent with absolutistic constitutional law.
The Security Council may, whenever it chooses, "recommend ap-
propriate procedures or methods" of adjusting a dispute or a situation
(Article 36), with the proviso that "legal disputes should as a general
rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice."
Hence, the Council has primary jurisdiction over political and non-
justiciable disputes.
The most far-reaching powers are conferred upon the Security Coun-
cil by Article 39 which reads:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
...to maintain or restore international peace and security."
before making recommendations or decisions, however, the Security
Council may call upon the parties "to comply with such provisional
measures as it deems necessary or desirable" (Article 40). This seems
to be a broader as well as a vaguer formulation of the Protocol's provi-
sion for the creation of demilitarized zones. Article 51 accords to any
state "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
67. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Chairman of the United States Delegation to the United
Nations Conference at San Francisco, Letter of June 26, 1945, to the President. DrP'r or
STATE, CONFERENCE SER. No. 72, at 7.
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armed attack occurs." This provision was, apparently, designed to
remove Austen Chamberlain's objection previously mentionedcs Since,
however, aggressive acts are often termed "acts of defense," this article
may leave wide leeway to a diplomatically and propagandistically skill-
ful aggressor. One danger is avoided, another courted; the squaring
of the circle is not more difficult than the legal construction of eternal
peace.
Besides the right to make recommendations, the Council may
decide upon the employment of non-military measures of coercion,
such as "complete or partial (sic!) interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations" (,Article
41). It may also order military measures of coercion "as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations" (Article 42).
In short, the Council has the power to order military intervention or,
in traditional parlance, war. In its military decisions, the Council will
be advised and assisted by a technical Military Staff Committee,
which will include the chiefs of staff of the permanent members or their
representatives. Thus, Clemenceau's proposal comes to life.
The members are obligated to can, out the decisions of the Security
Council even if they do not agree with them. Yet like the Covenant
and the Protocol, the Charter contains only "imperfect obligations"
in that no action is stipulated that may be taken against members re-
fusing to abide by the Council's decisions.
In theory, the Council may commit any country which is not a
permanent member of the Security Council to war-like acts without its
(the country's) desire or declaration of war. The right to declare war
may thus no longer be considered as the exclusive prerogative of
national sovereigns. However, the text is extremely vague. How far
will war-like acts carried out on the order of the Security Council
legally commit the countries of origin of the military contingents? The
position could very well be taken that once a military unit has come
under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, it is no longer part of
the armed forces of its native country. Such an interpretation would
mean that while the members may subscribe to the policies of the
Security Council qua members of the United Nations, they can dis-
avow them qua independent national states.
THE INTERNATION.&L POLICE
Articles 43 and 45 endow the Security Council with the means neces-
sary to enforce its decisions. These articles stipulate that "all Members
6S. See text discussion supra, at 933-4.
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of the United Nations ...undertake to make available to the Se-
curity Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights
of passage" (Article 43). To make possible "urgent military measures,
Members shall hold immediately available national air force contin-
gents for combined international enforcement action" (Article 45).
It will be observed that the Security Council can call only on those
forces which will be put at its disposal by special agreements which
still are to be concluded. These agreements shall fix "the numbers and
types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the
nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided" (Article 43). The
Security Council can plan for the combined action of the national air
force contingents only "within the limits laid down in the special agree-
ment or agreements" (Article 45). It is true that the agreements shall
be negotiated at the initiative of the Security Council, but they "shall
be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance. with
their respective constitutional processes" (Article 43).
This provision may, in various ways, destroy or cripple the military
strength of the international forces. For example, they may not be
ratified, like several of their Geneva predecessors. Even if ratified, the
maintenance of the military contingents to be transferred to the Coun-
cil is dependent upon budgetary allocation by national legislatures.
The military budgets will, in the beginning, probably be authorized
through the agreements of implementation; yet if these budgets are
large (as they must be if the international force is to be strong), the
agreements probably cannot be concluded for very long periods but
may have to be re-negotiated at short intervals. If so, composition and
strength of the contingents can be altered at every re-negotiation at
the will of the legislatures. The conclusion of very long-term agree-
ments would, of course, greatly impair the fundamental budgetary
rights of democratic legislatures, a problem which may become serious
if financial difficulties arise.
The real extent of the Council's powers has as yet not been deter-
mined. Future failure to secure agreements implementing the general
provisions of the Charter would make the Articles dealing with en-
forcement meaningless. It is not unlikely that later developments will,
for all practical purposes, limit the executive powers of the Council;
individual members may wish to retain the sovereign right to approve
or deny war-like actions of their military forces. Hence in major con-
flicts it may not be possible to commit national contingents to sanctions
without previous explicit approval of the national governments or
legislatures. Perhaps no such restriction will be put upon the use of
small contingents which may unconditionally be placed under the
Council's orders. If so, the "immediately available" international
force would be weak and its intervention would have little military
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importance. Whether it will have symbolic or political influence will
depend on the willingness and ability of the nations to support the
contingents with whatever national military power may be required
to subdue the aggressor. It would have been advisable if the functions
of the international force had been clearly circumscribed as in the
Tardieu plan. 9
THE TECHNICAL AGREEiIENTS
It would be a fallacy to assume that the drafting of the agreements
of implementation is a mere technicality or that the purely military
problems of an international force can be solved with relative ease."
In fact, these problems are at least as complex as those of disarmament;
while it would be wrong to say that disarmament failed because its
technical problems were not solved, the fact remains that no generally
satisfactory solution was found or even suggested. There are numer-
ous difficulties inherent in setting up an international force which, if
they can be overcome at all, will require organizations and arrange-
ments so highly complicated that their sabotage, or misuse, should be a
relatively easy matter.
If a modern international force becomes very strong, the persons
who command it or the nations who control the international com-
manders may impose their will on the rest of the world. If the force is
not overwhelmingly strong, it cannot fulfill its primary function. If the
international force is concentrated within one region, it will exert very
strong influence there, but its presence may not influence events in
distant parts. Concentration at one place makes possible a devastating
attack against the international force, yet dispersion-no strength
anywhere, weakness everywhere--will be tantamount to emasculation.
There may be complicated keys according to which the international
force will change positions and personnel in order to avoid abuse of
command posts for personal or national interests. Yet we must re-
member that during more than 2,000 years, hundreds of governments
and soldiers have made attempts to solve similar problems typical of
coalition war, and no generally applicable solution was ever found.
In modern war the army equipped with technically superior weapons
possesses a great and frequently decisive advantage. But what degree
of technical perfection -ill the weapons have which are put at the
disposal of the international force? If one nation relinquishes its best
arms to the force, it will ipso facto inform other nations, including a
possible enemy, of its military secrets and thereby jeopardize its own
security. Not all nations will desire to reveal their secrets. There can
be no law to compel them to do so, not even on the basis of a second-
69. See text discussion supra, at 935.
70. The purely technical aspects of an international air force are dicursed at length
in the author's forthcoming book on air power, to be published by TnE Iti, ray Joura,,L.
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level enforcement superimposed on ordinary enforcement. Violations
in this field are undoubtedly easy, and as soon as the mere suspicion
exists that one nation keeps its secrets, all others must follow suit. Yet
an international force equipped with yesteryear's weapons will have
little chance of stopping the aggressor who, incidentally, will have
guarded his military secrets most jealously. The French proposals of
1932 were logical in that they wanted to arm the international police
with the best weapons, but such a goal seems unattainable.
Logistics and supplies interpose other tremendous obstacles. Im-
mediately available strength is of relatively little importance. If a
force consisting only of troops of the line is thrown against a strong
aggressor, it cannot sustain its attack; after a few desultory engage-
ments it will no longer exist. The international force can remain a
military force only on condition that it is kept continuously supplied
with new equipment and replacements, but even if the nations agree
and desire to do so, their ability to fulfill this obligation depends on the
state of their own industrial mobilization. Without continuous indus-
trial mobilization, the international force simply cannot be kept ad-
equately supplied. Without control of industry by the Security Council
or its staff, the international force is, at best, capable of fighting one
battle.
Proponents of the international air force usually overlook the crucial
importance of logistics and supplies. Whether the international air
force consists of 1,000 or 2,000 planes is not the question at all; the
question is at what strength the international air force can be maintained.
The original strength will be quickly destroyed, especially if the ag-
gressor possesses superior aircraft. Yet to maintain a bomber force
with real striking power, full industrial mobilization in one or more
large industrialized countries is required. Even assuming that no
political obstacle would be interposed, supplying the international air
force with adequate bombing power could not begin before many
months and possibly years. But what good would an international air
force do if it could not become an effective military force at the very
moment of aggression?
To be sure, some of these limitations may be overcome through the
use of the atomic bomb; yet as the United Nations must attempt to
outlaw this weapon, such a contingency need not be considered. Even
if no legal restrictions are placed on the employment of the atomic
weapon, the United Nations cannot very well set a precedent legalizing
atomic warfare.
THE VETo
The most serious of all limitations placed upon the future inter-
national force is the legal impossibility of its use against one of the five
presently existing major military powers.
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The conversations which were initiated between the Security Coun-
cil and the powers are predicated upon the assumption that the inter-
national forces can, on account of the veto (Article 27), be used only
against countries of minor military strength (and against a former kds
country, should it recover). The veto may be justified on the ground
that enforcement action without participation or approval of the
"leading nations" w11 lack military striking-power as well as truly
supra-national authority desirable for common internationa1 action.
The present voting procedure is, no doubt, much more workable than
the unanimity rule of the Covenant which permitted any small country
to block decisions. Yet while the voting rules of the Covenant prac-
tically prevented enforcement action, the rules of the Charter in effect
provide that the Security Council can act only in secondary matters.
Threats to world peace do not arise from small powers except insofar as
a small power may fire the first shot with the backing of a major mili-
tary power. Aggression cannot occur if the big military powers are
united and pursue a coordinated policy. It occurs only if the aggressor
has succeeded in splitting the major powers or if the aggressor is him-
self a first-class military nation. While the Charter may offer protec-
tion against small dangers, it offers none against the chief danger-v.ar
between the big powers.
This fundamental weakness of the Charter has been widely recog-
nized, and the opinion is often voiced that through the abolition of the
veto the United Nations may be transformed into a reliable instrument
of peace preservation. Yet while it may be possible to abolish the veto
dejure, it is questionable whether, in serious cases, it can be abolished
defacto. No state, least of all a major power, will participate in enforce-
ment action against its own judgment or interests. While the Charter
may be modified to the effect that a veto will no longer be a legal block
to action on the part of affirmatively voting members of the Security
Council, there is no way to make the decisions of the Council obliga-
tory for the vetoing state. The dissenting member could abstain from
any action which the rump Council might order. This arrangement
might work out satisfactorily should the aggressor be a secondary
country aiming at an objective of little overall importance, with the
dissenting permanent member being sympathetic to the aggressor but
unwilling to lend it more than diplomatic assistance.
Should, however, the object under litigation be of great international
and strategic importance, a veto lodged by a permanent member
would serve notice that he will not allow interference with the aggres-
sor's plans. If the aggressor country is adjacent to vital territory of the
protesting permanent member, he may not permit enforcement action
in these regions. As a variant, the aggressor may have attacked on the
secret suggestion of the permanent member, or actually as his proxy;
in such a case, the permanent member would be ready to defend the
aggressor with his own military forces.
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If the aggressor is a permanent member, the international force
minus the contingents of the aggressor and his friends would be utterly
inadequate for the purpose of stopping aggression. To defeat the
aggressor, the other powers would be compelled to mobilize fully and
to attack in force; thus enforcement action would be tantamount to
world war.
That the abolition of the veto would often prove futile may also be
gathered from the possibility that not only one but several permanent
members may object to peace enforcement. Member A vetoes enforce-
ment against one of his satellites and threatens to consider intervention
as a casus belli. Thereupon, member B, not desiring to go to war, also
vetoes the proposal. What will the other three permanent members
do? If the dispute affects their vital interests, they may be compelled
to fight, yet if war does not appear inevitable they are not likely to use a
debilitated international force, court its destruction, and provoke the
very war they want to avoid.
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY
Enforcement was an integral part of many peace systems which have
been proposed throughout history; yet only now is an attempt made
to set up an international police and to create permanent institutions
through which peace enforcement may be carried out. In this sense
the Charter constitutes a pioneering experiment, but it is certainly not
a definite solution. The United Nations will possibly be able to prevent
some wars, especially those which "break out" without being willed by
anybody. Re-reading, for example, the history of the events which
led to the wars of 1870 and 1914, one can see that there may have been
opportunities which a well-functioning Security Council could have
seized to avert these wars. That the United Nations will be able to
master the great crises of history and prevent those major wars which
are provoked deliberately by powerful nations is doubtful; in fact, it is
highly improbable. What is more, it cannot even be claimed that the
basic soundness of the idea of peace coercion has been definitely estab-
lished.
This idea was conceived per analogiam to domestic peace and se-
curity. Unfortunately, the analogy between the sheriff and the inter-
national gendarme is tenable only within limits. Some wars may be of a
criminal nature, but war cannot be compared to crime. While the
criminal clearly violates laws and customs, war may actually be a
valid and necessary expression of a nation's will. International rela-
tions, or to choose a more appropriate term, history, cannot be regu-
lated in the same way as safety is organized in the streets of a suburban
town.




(1) While the behavior of individuals is prescribed by an all-inclusive
body of law which defines clearly whether or not an.act is illicit and
punishable, no such law exists in the international sphere. The decision
not to incorporate into the Charter objective criteria for determining
acts of aggression 71 is an admission that international society cannot be
administered like a national community. It also implies that the prin-
ciple nul/um crimten sine lege does not obtain in international relations.
(2) Bertrand Russell once said that "the use of force is justifiable
when it is ordered in accordance with law by a neutral authority in the
general interest." While it is an essential tenet of domestic justice that
the judges should not be parties to a dispute, no such rule can be ap-
plied in international disputes. The Security Council, hybrid legislator-
judge-sheriff, is composed of "interested parties" whose om vital
interests may be at stake and who are unable to judge any case sine
ira et studio. They cannot speak in the name of general interest, except
by arrogation. Even with the best intentions, the members of the
Security Council must decide in accordance with their individual
political interests. Any arrogation of an international agency to
determine what the nations should consider to be right or wrong must,
sooner or later, lead to intervention in the domestic lives of nations; an
interventional policy amounts, in the last analysis, to the imposition of
governments upon nations and to the abrogation of the droil des peuples
de disposer d'eux-7anes. To be sure, the manner in which this right
may be exercised should be more clearly defined in order to avoid the
adoption of policies detrimental to other nations. But exhumation of
the principle of intervention may drive small nations to follow, as they
did 100 and 125 years ago, a policy which was expressed by the Hun-
garian poet Petoefi: "Life is dear to me, love dearer still, but I would
give them both for liberty." 72
(3) The life of nations follows other rules than the life of persons.
There is such a thing as a bellum instum, at least according to the funda-
mental beliefs of the nations waging it. Nations may resort to war to
gain national independence, to remove conditions which obstruct
progress or condemn them to poverty, or they may fight in the pursuit
of what they consider their highest ideals.
(4) We have seen that attempts to outlaw war must, in some way
or other, be based upon the sanctity of the status quo, at least as long
as there are no effective methods of "peaceful change." Law can be
enforced in domestic life because the principles of justice change ex-
tremely slowly and because, in the sphere of criminal offense, the law
does not fluctuate. Yet in other fields, the status quo cannot be main-
tained even domestically. It has been said that only one form of gov-
71. Fox, Colkctire Enforceam- of Peace and Scrurity (1945) 39 An. POL. Sc. Rnv. 972.
72. Quoted from SkRFATTz, THE LiFE oF BEmNo MUSSOLIt't (1925) 179.
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emment can prevent fundamental political and social transformations,
namely, "un despotismo corretto dalla difenestrazione"; yet even this
"ideal" governmental organization does not stop incessant change.
Democracy is a superior system precisely because it permits con-
tinuous adaptations. It should never be forgotten that intra-national
violence is still recognized, for example, in the form of strikes and that
the domestic enforcement of law is possible only because the individual
may advance through labor, service, trade, organization, and marriage
and that, in modem societies, hardly anybody is compelled, for his
subsistence, to kill and rob. Yet no effective methods of "peaceful
change" have as yet been developed in the international field, where,
in most cases, the status quo can be broken only by brute force.
CAN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY BE CURTAILED?
The idea is frequently advanced that, to make the Security Council
militarily and politically powerful, nations should transfer elements of
their sovereignty to the international authority. Nations may indeed
restrain themselves in exercising their prerogatives, but sovereignty is
not merely a legal concept or a right that may be bestowed upon, or
taken away from, a nation. Sovereignty is a fact in the same sense that
power is a fact.7 3 It simply means that some nations possess the mate-
rial strength to make vital decisions without taking counsel from any-
body. When they so choose, their decisions may run counter to the
interests of other nations. The establishment of an international
authority would not alter the geographical power distribution on the
globe. The elements of power cannot be removed, but will remain
where they are; hence power centers may continue to engage in com-
petition with each other. It is an inherent weakness of the interna-
tional force that it can possess derivative power only; it may control
some instruments of coercion, but not the sources of power; it will have
weapons and troops, but no war potential. As long as the majority of
nations uphold the principle of self-determination and are unwilling
to hand over control of their industries and other resources, the inter-
national force can act only, through agencies of national power. Hence
the sources of its strength may dry up.
How CAN A STRONG AGGRESSOR BE STOPPED?
It is a historical fact that most major wars in modem times broke
out because the strongest country attacked or because an aggressive
alliance of superior military power was created. Implicitly or ex-
plicitly, the idea of international peace coercion is always predicated
73. The impossibility to "surrender" sovereignty is discussed in Viner, The Implica-




upon the assumption that the community of peace-loving nations is
vastly stronger than the aggressor. This assumption may be correct
insofar as war potentials are concerned and, in recent history every
aggressor nation aiming at world hegemony has been ultimately de-
feated by the superior strength of its opponents. But this assumption
is usually wrong in terms of mobilized military strength at the precise
moment of aggression.
Aggressors calculate their chances, pitting their own strength, speed
of mobilization, strategy, material, and presumed speed of advance
against the military capabilities of their opponents. If they believe
that they can make their position impregnable before these opponents
attack in full strength, they will attack. This, then, is the military
weakness of any peace league, including the United Nations; peace
might be enforced by superior military power, but an aggressor who is
substantially, even though temporarily, stronger than his opponents
cannot be restrained.
Regardless of the edstence of an international force, the potential
aggressor will desist only if he is convinced (a) that other military
powers will not hesitate to throw their full strength against him without
delay; (b) that their full strength will be superior to his own; and
(c) that the superior military strength will appear on the battlefield
before the aggressor has secured the final decision.
In other words, aggression by a major power can be stopped only
on the condition that a defensive alliance is concluded before, and not
after, the attack, and that it is made effectfi'e by timely mobilization
which must proceed at the same or at a quicker rate as the mobilization
of the aggressor. The terms of such alliances will vary from case to
case. The three-level peace construction of the Holy Alliance is log-
ically still the most reliable safeguard against war-a general pact,
enforcement against secondary and potential threats to the peace, and a
specific and effective defensive alliance against the potential major
aggressor. Only by checking major aggression can the intentions of
the general pact be fulfilled, that is, world peace be preserved. Checks
against the strongest potential aggressor 2nust be the keystone of any peace
system.
CAUSES AND SM VPTOMS OF VA!
Enforcement by an -international police cannot become reliable and
effective before world society has assumed a character similar to that of
individual nations.74 The unification and integration of the world will
74. SPARN, GEIST uND GEWALT IN DER VOELIEPOLITIE (1937) 173, points out that
the 22 cantons of Switzerland had their own armed forces and were frequently warring
against each other. The last war between Swiss cantons, the so-called Sondcrbundslnreg,
took place in 1847; afterwards, a new constitution was adopted, the cantons were dizarmed,
and the federal government alone was permitted to keep military force.
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presumably continue, and perhaps barriers between nations will
crumble. "II faut spiritualiser les frontieres," said the Rumanian
Foreign Minister Titulescu a decade ago. As the world unifies, inter-
national forces will develop; a world state needs as its corollary a world
police. But as long as there is one world merely in phraseology, and
not in political reality, international security cannot be patterned after
the model of domestic security. "Broadly speaking, international (or
better, supemational) ways of thinking, feeling, and acting cannot be
simply superimposed on national ways. The larger mode will not
embrace the smaller; it must replace it by means of a thorough permea-
tion." 71
Peace cannot be legislated. "The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed." 7o
I The major objection to peace enforcement is, therefore, that it
attacks only the symptoms, but not the causes of war. Private warfare
was not ended by a strong central government alone; in the course of
five centuries, it vanished together with feudal society and medieval
technology, which provided knights and lbrds with military strength.
Wars are due to social, economic, ideological, and political "incom-
patibility"; if the "integration of the systems of the basic values and
their mutual compatibility . . . and harmoniousness decline, espe-
cially suddenly and sharply, the chances for international or civil war
increase." 11 Throughout history, wars occurred most frequently in
times of radical and quick social and economic transformation; the
increasing closeness of social and cultural contacts between peoples
did not lead, as was expected, to better mutual understanding but to a
greater incidence and destructiveness of war. The slowing-down of
social transformations and the integration of values would then appear
to be an indispensable prerequisite of peace preservation. To become
effective, the' international army would have to be supplemented by
systematic policies on the part of all nations, aiming at the abolition
of the fundamental causes of war,-if such policies can be devised.
True, even under present conditions, the international force may some-
times be a handy tool to master crises arising from the turmoil of social
transformation. The point is that social dynamics and the ensuing
differentiation of norms and values' are likely to break the tool. An
75. ORTON, THE LIBERAL TRADITION. A STUDY OF T E SOCIAL AND SPIRITUAL CON'
DITIONS OF FREEDOM (1945) 255.
76. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 1.
77. Sorokln, The Cause of War and Conditions of a Lasting Peace in APPROACuES O
WORLD PEACE, FOURTH SymposIum (1944) 90.
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international force within a divided world is a paradox that may not
be resolved.
Throughout the ages, more than 8,000 peace treaties and hundreds
of peace plans have been worked out by the world's great thinkers.
Statesmen of first rank and achievement, from medieval Popes through
Wolsey, Metternich, Clemenceau, to the Allied leaders in the second
World War, attempted to organize universal and permanent peace.
None ever devised a method of peace enforcement which was depend-
able and effective. Time and again the painfully elaborated peace
organizations broke down; nations refused to undenrite international
commitments or violated solemnly contracted pacts. What is the
scientific basis for the expectation that the behavior of nations vill be
different in the future? What are the social facts from which a world of
solidarity and convergent interests will emerge? Where are the tech-
nical solutions which will permit the effective use of international
forces against the danger of major wars?
Since war was an integral part of the society as we have knovm it in
history, the conclusion seems unavoidable that war cannot quickly be
abolished unless a new type of society without fundamental cleavages
is created. Assuming, for argument's sake, that the basic tenets of
society can be changed, and that the change may be effected within a
short period of time, the speedy re-planning of society will not be
feasible except through conflict, violence, revolution, and war. Peace,
if it can be achieved at all through "organization" and the establish-
ment of institutions, can be won only at the price of var-the purge of
the enemies of the new order. This inner contradiction, which was
expressed by Dubois, must wreck any pacifist policy. Is it possible
that an entirely different approach to the problem of peace has become
necessary? To quote William A. Orton,
"The negative ideal of the prevention of war has no practical
force unless it is absorbed in the positive ideal of expanding com-
munity ... The positive creation of community must take
precedence over the historic futilities of the negative policy; and
those who are not interested in the extension of cooperative com-
munity must stop talking about peace, since all they really stand
for is the status quo." 71
78. ORTON, op. cit. supra note 75, at 250.
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